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Abstract. Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they 
have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of 
detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the 
methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation 
and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes 
that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 
1976a paper are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the rejection 
of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. In this paper Lakatos' 
later views on the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical theories and methodology are 
examined and specific attention is paid to what this view implies about the nature of 
mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences. 
1. Introduction 
Imre Lakatos’ views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and 
they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this 
respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and 
its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its 
implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are 
established in mathematics.1 The most important themes that run through his 
work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 1976a 
paper are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the 
rejection of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. 
When properly understood, the view that Lakatos presented in his 1976a 
article implies that while the methodology and epistemology of mathematics 
is a matter of rational thinking (pace the pessimistic irrationalists), it is not 
rational in the sense that it is constituted by a system of apodictically certain, 
a priori grounded Euclidean axioms, lemmas, and definitions from which 
theorems are deductively derived and thereby also secured as certainties. 
                                                        
1 See, for example, Larvor (1998). In Larvor’s book Lakatos’ 1976a is barely 
addressed at all. Koetsier (1991) is, however, a notable exception to this point, even 
though he wrongly argues that Lakatos’ 1976a work was incomplete and unsatisfactory 
due to Lakatos’ alleged failure to come to terms with the nature of the falsifiers for 
mathematical statements. 
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Lakatos held that this sort of model of mathematical knowledge is totally 
artificial and simply misleading. In accordance with his strong Popperian 
leanings, Lakatos held rather that the advancement of mathematical 
knowledge is far less rigid and that it is constituted by a sequence of 
conjectures followed by earnest attempts at refutation via the construction of 
falsifying counter-examples. So, according to Lakatos, in reality the 
methodology of pure mathematics is much more like the methodology of the 
physical sciences than it is like the artifice that is the Euclidean myth. Lakatos 
is very careful to indicate that this is made manifest simply by looking at the 
actual history of mathematical achievement. So, he held that our acceptance 
of the myth of the Euclidean system is simply the result of failing to pay 
careful enough attention to the history of mathematics as it is actually 
practiced. 2 In any case, in this paper Lakatos’ later views on the nature of 
mathematical theories and methodology will be examined and specific 
attention will be paid to what this view implies about the nature of 
mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences. 
2. Lakatos and the Philosophy of Mathematics 
Imre Lakatos is well-known and well-regarded for his contributions to the 
philosophy of science. Most notably, he is both well-known and well-
regarded for his articulation of the methodology of scientific research 
programs and his synthesis of methodological and historical approaches to 
the philosophy of science. His views in these respects were importantly 
related to the work of Popper, although Lakatos’ work on these problems is 
both novel and important in its own right. Lakatos, of course, also did 
considerable and deeply interesting work in the philosophy of mathematics 
that was also based on this essentially Popperian concept of methodology.3 
Nevertheless, this work has probably received far less attention than it 
deserves given the long standing problem of understanding the nature of 
mathematical statements in terms both of their ontological significance and 
their confirmation. In his sequence of articles in The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science titled “Proofs and Refutations”, Lakatos presented a 
deeply interesting (quasi-)empiricist approach to mathematics and its 
dynamics based on his 1961 Ph.D. dissertation Essays in the Logic of 
Mathematical Discovery.4 There is little doubt that “Proofs and Refutations” 
is Lakatos’ work on the methodology of mathematics that most philosophers 
of mathematics are familiar with. However, his posthumously published 
                                                        
2 It is important to note that this theme – one that was clearly initiated by Lakatos – 
has been emphasized more recently in the work of Kitcher (1981 and 1983) and Antonutti 
2010, for example.  
3 See Popper (1934/1959). 
4 See Lakatos (1963-4.) 
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1976 article “A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of 
Mathematics”, initially submitted to The British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science in 1967, also contains crucial work that importantly extends the 
views presented in his earlier work. Specifically, in his 1976 article (1976a) 
Lakatos introduces the crucially important concept of a quasi-empirical 
theory, and thereby attempts to further establish that mathematical theories, 
in point of fact, are identifiably empirical in some important sense, while also 
being importantly different than empirical theories in the natural sciences. In 
this latter work Lakatos buttressed his earlier 1963-4 view that we cannot 
adequately explain mathematics as the accumulation of timeless truths via 
some a priori method. But this critical aspect of Lakatos’ views on the 
methodology of mathematics does not itself provide us with an understanding 
of the precise sense in which mathematics is supposed to be empirical and 
how such theories differ from more familiar empirical theories in the natural 
sciences. However, some of the documents in the Lakatos archive at the 
London School of Economics and some of his less familiar published 
writings on these matters allow for the fleshing out of just what he took to be 
the actual, historically accurate, methodology of mathematics and how it is 
both similar and different from the properly empirical and experimental 
sciences. 
The typical understanding of Lakatos’ view of the methodology of 
mathematics is clearly derived from his extensive commentary on the matter 
in Proofs and Refutations. In the first appendix of that book Lakatos explains 
that the pattern of mathematical discovery takes the following basic form: 
(1) Primitive conjecture. 
(2) Proof (a rough thought-experiment or argument, decomposing the primitive 
conjecture into subconjectures or lemmas). 
(3) 'Global' counterexamples (counterexamples to the primitive conjecture) emerge.  
(4) Proof re-examined: the 'guilty lemma' to which the global counterexample is a 
'local' counterexample is spotted. This guilty lemma may have previously remained 
'hidden' or may have been misidentified. Now it is made explicit, and built into the 
primitive conjecture as a condition. The theorem – the improved conjecture – 
supersedes the primitive conjecture with the new proof-generated concept as its 
paramount new feature (1976b, p. 127). 
He adds that this basic methodological pattern is then sometimes followed 
by the following additional sequence of steps: 
(5) Proofs of other theorems are examined to see if the newly found lemma or the 
new proof-generated concept occurs in them: this concept may be found lying at 
cross-roads of different proofs, and thus emerge as of basic importance. 
(6) The hitherto accepted consequences of the original and now refuted conjecture are 
checked. 
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(7) Counterexamples are turned into new examples – new fields of inquiry open up 
(1976b, p. 128). 
The Lakatosian methodological account of the development of mathematics 
so understood is interesting in its own right, but it has been discussed much 
more thoroughly than has his later work, which essentially involves a more 
detailed epistemological characterization of steps (1)-(3). What his less 
familiar works allow us to see are the epistemological and methodological 
features involved in the establishing of mathematical claims and what this 
shows about their nature. 
3. The Myth of Euclideanism 
First and foremost Lakatos rejected the logical empiricist’s view that 
mathematical knowledge is “a priori, tautologous and infallible (1976a, p. 
201).” In various notes and papers Lakatos emphasizes that the traditional 
Euclidean view of mathematics cannot be correct, especially because many 
fields of mathematics flourished long before they were formally axiomatized. 
In a document in archive 4.9 titled “Empiricism in Contemporary 
Mathematical Philosophy”, for example, he explains both that, “...geometry 
was well developed long before Euclid” and that “...number theory flourished 
for centuries before it was axiomatized by Dedekind (5).” In response to this 
recognition Lakatos sought to deploy his own, historically based, concept of 
the methodology of research programs in pursuit of an acceptable 
explanation of the methodology and growth of the mathematical sciences. In 
this same manuscript he explicitly tells us that, “…a new philosophy of 
mathematics should be oriented on the growth rather than on the foundations 
of [mathematics] [and] has to take its inspiration in its turn from the history 
of mathematics (4.9, 4).” So, an adequate philosophy of mathematics should 
reflect this fallibility and the sloppier reality of mathematical practice. To this 
end, in appendix 2 of Proofs and Refutations he explains that, 
In deductivist style, all propositions are true and all inferences are valid. Mathematics 
is presented as an ever-increasing set of eternal, immutable truths. Counterexamples, 
refutations, criticism cannot possibly enter. An authoritarian air is secured for the 
subject by beginning with disguised monster-barring and proof-generated definitions 
and with the fully-fledged theorem, and by suppressing the primitive conjecture, the 
refutations, and the criticism of the proof. Deductivist style hides the struggle, hides 
the adventure. The whole story vanishes, the successive tentative formulations of the 
theorem in the course of the proof-procedure are doomed to oblivion while the end 
result is exalted into sacred infallibility (1976b, p. 142). 
So, Lakatos clearly indicates that the presentation of mathematical 
knowledge as a deductive Euclidean system is totally artificial, and as such 
it obscures the actual methodology of mathematics and distorts our 
understanding of the nature of mathematical claims. The myth of the 
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Euclidean methodology of mathematics omits all of the really important 
details of the actual proof-procedures as they are employed in actual 
mathematical research that nets real results, and it falsely gives the 
impression that mathematical methodology involves the a priori deduction of 
a priori truths from other a priori truths. The Euclidean system is then nothing 
more than a sanitized fabrication that leaves out the real epistemic procedures 
of the much more “sloppy” world of the practicing mathematician, and that 
also misconstrues the nature of mathematical expressions. 
4. The Real Methodology of Mathematics 
So, Lakatos systematically argued that mathematics is itself established by 
the Popperian method of conjecture and refutation, but not in precisely the 
same way that physical theories are developed. Rather, mathematics appears 
to actually develop by the fallible conjecture of “pre-axiomatic” lower-level 
theorems that are then – and only sometimes – rather artificially knitted into 
Euclidean-like deductive systems. Moreover, these systems are ultimately 
empirical in the sense that “the logical flow in such quasi-empirical theories 
is not the transmission of truth but rather the retransmission of falsity – from 
special theorems at the bottom (‘basic statements’) up towards the set of 
axioms (1976a, 205-206)”. In a revealing note in the archive manuscript 4.9 
he explains that in 1962 he had used the term ‘empiricist’ for the general 
notion of empirical methodology, but that later in 1965 he had replaced this 
term in his work with the expression ‘quasi-empirical’ in order to make an 
important distinction among types of scientific theories. However, of this 
usage he importantly goes on to add that, “…perhaps the best will be to say 
‘Popperian’ (4.9, 5).” So, Lakatos’ view of the methodology of mathematics 
is really just an important extension of his modified Popperian 
methodological account of science from his 1970 to the formal sciences. 
In his published 1976a article he importantly explains about this concept 
of the methodology of meta-mathematics that  
…whether a theory is Euclidean or quasi-empirical is decided by the pattern of truth 
value flow in the system. The system is Euclidean if the characteristic flow is the 
transmission of truth from the set of axioms ‘downwards’ to the rest of the system…is 
quasi-empirical if the characteristic flow is retransmission of falsity from the false 
basic statements ‘upwards’ towards the ‘hypothesis’ (Lakatos, 1976a, p. 206). 
So, the real issue is first and foremost one of the structure of the justification 
that characterizes a particular system. As he explains in his 1976a, it is not 
what flows qua justification that is important for this distinction (i.e. truth, 
probability, certain truth, etc.), but rather “… it is the how of the flow that is 
decisive (206).” He revealingly also tells us that, “…in a Euclidean theory 
the axioms prove, as it were, the theorems; in a quasi-empirical theory the 
axioms explain the theorems (m.s., 4.9, 4, see also 1976a, p. 206).” What is 
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then curious is that Lakatos tells us that “…a theory which is quasi-empirical 
in my sense may be either empirical or non-empirical in the usual sense: it is 
empirical only if its basic theorems are spatio-temporal singular basic 
statements whose truth values are decided by the time-honored but unwritten 
code of the experimental scientist (1976a, 206).” So, the crucial issue is then 
whether or not particular elements of pure mathematics – which are all, 
according to Lakatos, quasi-empirical – qualify as properly empirical. If they 
are properly empirical, then they are based on theorems the truth of which 
can be determined experimentally. In his 1976a and in a document from 
archive 4.9 titled “Critical Fallibilism Versus Inductive Empiricism in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics” Lakatos proceeds to explain that “…a Euclidean 
theory may be claimed to be true; a quasi-empirical theory – at best – to be 
well-corroborated, but always conjectural (1976a, 206, m.s. 3-4).” As a 
result, given that we are dealing with a quasi-empirical system, one key issue 
for Lakatos is then one of the nature of the conjectures constituting the 
scientific system in question. But, as we shall ultimately see, for Lakatos this 
is a question about how such conjectures relate to certain other propositions 
that serve as basic statements in those systems. 
The idea is then that, according to Lakatos, mathematics is crucially like 
empirical science in the sense that its methodology is speculative, 
imaginative and fallible because of the actual justificational structure of 
mathematical theories. Both are essentially Popperian and explanatory in 
character rather than Euclidean in nature. The history of mathematics is then 
just the history of conjecture and refutation of mathematical theorems and 
not the derivation of such theorems from indubitable mathematical axioms 
that are known a priori. As a result, Lakatos’ criticism in this respect is most 
directly a criticism of the classical rationalistic axiomatic approach to the 
sciences, especially in the case of the formal science of mathematics. 
However, Lakatos’ understanding of mathematics as quasi-empirical does 
not commit him to the view, as was held by Mill and other more 
naturalistically minded philosophers, that mathematics is properly empirical. 
This issue then ultimately turns on the nature of the basic statements that 
ground a given system of conjectures. Specifically, it concerns the nature of 
the potential falsifiers of those basic statements (1976a, p. 213). Lakatos tells 
us that “The ‘nature’ of a quasi-empirical theory [i.e. whether it is properly 
empirical or merely quasi-empirical] is decided by the nature of the truth-
value injections into its potential falsifiers (1976a, p. 213).” However he goes 
on to add that, “Now nobody will claim that mathematics is empirical in the 
sense that its potential falsifiers are singular spatio-temporal statements 
(1976a, 213).” Whether or not this claim is in fact correct, there are two 
important distinctions that are necessary to properly characterize the 
methodology of mathematics according to Lakatos. First, according to 
Lakatos, given Euclidean systems at one extreme and what we might call 
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“broadly Popperian” or quasi-empirical systems on the other (i.e. those 
developed at the level of theorems and which proceed by conjecture and 
refutation) mathematical methodology is of the latter sort. However, the mere 
rejection of the Euclidean axiomatic method of science is not itself sufficient 
to properly characterize the methodology of mathematics. In order to 
properly achieve such a characterization, we also need to recognize the 
distinction between systems based on basic statements with empirical 
falsifiers, and those that do not have basic statements with empirical 
falsifiers. According to Lakatos, mathematics is a system of the latter sort. 
So, the taxonomy of scientific systems breaks down simply as follows: 
Scientific Systems 
 
                         Euclidean Systems                     Popperian Systems 
 
               Merely Quasi-Empirical Systems      Properly Empirical Systems 
Given this more explicit understanding of the taxonomy of scientific systems, 
it is then important to note that Lakatos is rather skeptical about the 
possibility of Euclidean-like axiomatization of many theories (see section 3 
of Lakatos, 1976a). More importantly, he staunchly defended the view that 
the historical emphasis on axiomatization in meta-mathematics is both 
historically and conceptually anachronistic (m.s. 4.9). What we should grasp 
from this insightful observation is that the methodology of mathematics is 
much more like that of the properly empirical sciences simply because the 
justificational structure of both properly empirical and merely quasi-
empirical theories is the same and both are not Euclidean in this respect. Of 
course, those of us who are yet bolder empiricists (especially those who are 
of a naturalistic bent) would perhaps like to argue that mathematics is itself 
a properly empirical science. 
In any case, it is with respect to this latter issue (i.e. that of the potential 
falsifiers for mathematical conjectures) that there has been some serious 
misunderstanding of Lakatos’ views on the similarity of mathematics and the 
properly empirical science. Specifically, Koetsier (1991) argues at length that 
Lakatos struggled with his understanding of the nature of the potential 
falsifiers for mathematical statements throughout his work on the 
methodology of mathematics, and so was not happy with his 1976a. Koetsier 
says that, “Lakatos has difficulties to point out precisely what are the 
potential falsifiers in mathematics (1991, p. 62).” Moreover, he also says that, 
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“…being unable to locate the mathematical analogon of the singular spatio-
temporal statements, Lakatos switches to a different perspective in which 
theories are compared on the basis of their explanatory power (1991, p. 62).” 
On this basis Koetsier ultimately claims that, “In ‘A Renaissance’ [i.e. 
Lakatos 1976a] Lakatos wanted to show that mathematics is fallible in a way 
analogous to the fallibility of natural science in Popper’s philosophy, but he 
did not succeed (1991, p. 63).” This critique misses the point that Lakatos 
was primarily concerned with steps (1)-(3) in his 1976a and that he was more 
concerned in that work with the structural features of mathematical 
methodology. But, in his earlier work in 1976b he had already settled this 
issue. The analogs of the singular spatio-temporal statements that serve as 
falsifiers in properly empirical theories and which serve as falsifiers in 
mathematics are imaginary mathematical objects. This is clearly the case and 
the interplay between the counterexamples to the mathematical conjectures 
that Lakatos considers throughout his 1976b are all explicitly described as 
thought-experiments. Lakatos’ 1976b is replete with references to the 
imaginary nature of the potential falsifiers in mathematics (e.g. see 1976b, p. 
9, pp. 74-76 and 86), and this in turn is used also to explain the fallibility of 
mathematics. Just as in the case of properly empirical theories, mathematical 
theories can be protected from refutation by treating counterexamples as 
special cases and then defusing such refutations by directing them away from 
the core of the theory. This is the whole point of his extensive discussion of 
monster-barring, local and global counterexamples and testing in 1976b. So, 
there really is no shift in Lakatos’ theory of mathematical methodology from 
refutation by potential falsifier to purely explanatory considerations. Lakatos 
clearly holds that the validation of theories in mathematics depends on 
potential falsification by imaginary cases and that mathematical theories, 
when successful, are explanatory with respect to those falsifiers. This is 
admittedly a complex process of accommodation that gives rise to the sort of 
fallibility that Lakatos famously identified in the properly empirical sciences 
in his 1970. Thus, Lakatos’ philosophy of mathematics is better understood 
through the lens of his 1976a and 1976b. In 1976b he focuses more attention 
on the nature of the potential falsifiers in mathematics and in 1976a he 
focuses more on the structural features of mathematical theories. 
5. Conclusion: The Nature of Mathematical Claims 
What is most interesting about Lakatos’ later work on the philosophy of 
mathematics is its rather radical implications for the epistemology and 
methodology of mathematics. What his quasi-empiricism implies about 
mathematical argument and justification is that real, historically accurate, 
mathematical argument and hence mathematical justification proceeds from 
the conjecture of theorems to their revision by the use of thought-experiments 
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intended to refute such conjectures and not by the derivation of a priori 
theorems from a priori axioms. So, according to Lakatos, characterizing 
mathematics in terms of Euclidean systems is a deeply misleading myth that 
diverts us from seeing that mathematics involves looking for counter-
examples that serve as falsifiers. The search for falsifiers in mathematics is 
just the search for exceptions to initially conjectured theorems by the use of 
imagination.5 But this is only because the truth of such falsifiers cannot 
(typically) be experimentally established and can only be achieved by 
thought-experiment. This is in turn true because usually the falsifiers for such 
conjectures are not singular spatio-temporal statements. As such, our beliefs 
with respect to mathematical theories are radically fallibilistic and they are 
justified only in the sense of remaining unrefuted (i.e. they are merely 
corroborated in the Popperian sense) by imaginary counter-examples. This is 
of course a radical departure from the view that the results of mathematical 
investigation are necessary truths derived from a priori axioms, but it is not 
an unexpected consequence when one recognizes the structural similarity 
between properly empirical theories and quasi-empirical theories as Lakatos 
did. What it further suggests is that mathematical argumentation is far less 
rigorous than is typically assumed and it is bounded at the basic level of 
falsifiers only by the limits of mathematical imagination. In articulating this 
position Lakatos establishes that the nature of mathematical truth is a 
function of how mathematical theories relate to certain types of basic 
statements that serve as falsifiers for those theoretical claims, just as in the 
case of the properly empirical sciences. So, in adopting this view Lakatos 
offered a broadly unified and more realistic account of the methodology of 
the formal and properly empirical sciences, and that is an important 
achievement. His view respects the messy details of real mathematical 
practice and it does not introduce a separate and utterly speculative 
methodology for mathematics. 
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